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Corporate Investment Efficiency: The Role of Financial Development in 
Firms with Financing Constraints and Agency Issues in OECD Non-
Financial Firms 
Abstract 
Corporate investment in firms deviates from optimal level due to financing and agency issues. 
Managers of the affected firms trap into over- or under-investment causing investment 
inefficiencies. Earlier research fails to address the ramifications of financial development on 
over- and under-investment of firms. This study tries to fill this gap. Analyzing an annual 
unbalanced panel dataset of non-financial firms in 35 OECD member countries from 1990 to 
2015, our empirical results show that 1) financial development has a positive impact on 
corporate investment; and 2) for a one standard deviation increase in financial development, 
it can help to increase investment efficiency by 0.423 percent for under investing firms 
(mostly due to financing constraints), and to reduce investment inefficiency in firms that are 
currently over investing (mostly due to agency issues) by 0.902 percent. When economic 
growth is taken into consideration, financial development is most effective on improving 
investment efficiency for both under- and over-investment firms in countries with high GDP 
growth rates. Overall, these findings suggest that monitoring and financing mechanisms of 
financial development have positive implications on corporate investment efficiency. Our 
findings are robust to alternative specifications. 
Keywords: Corporate investment; Under-investment; Over-investment; Financial 
development; OECD. 
JEL classification: C33, G31, G34, O16, O43. 
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1. Introduction 
Investment in good capital projects brings additional value to the firm and it is rational for 
managers to pursue as many value-maximizing investment opportunities as available. But, 
scarce resources available to firms render a limit to this possibility of indefinite investments. 
Managers have discretionary powers to assign funds among competing investment projects. 
Funds, if, allocated in an efficient manner, inculcates corporate investment efficiency which 
leads to sustainable profitability and growth for the firms. Since future of a firm depends on 
its investment efficiency, it is presumed that firm resources will be used in a best possible 
way and with minimum wastage. 
Ideally, fiduciary duty of managers conforms them to critically evaluate investment 
projects and choose only those that enhance corporate value. However, prior research show 
that managers do not always allocate resources efficiently (Jensen, 1986; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Managers have the tendency to waste funds by either, over-utilizing funds in valueless 
projects, or, under-utilizing them by withholding investments despite the existence of 
profitable opportunities. This over- and under-utilization of funds impedes investment 
efficiency. Love (2003) and Castro et al. (2015) suggest that higher financial development 
should increase investment efficiency by reducing financing constraints in a firm. Their 
finding leads to a further question whether higher financial development is linked with a 
decrease in either under-investment or over-investment. In this regard, our study aims to find 
empirical evidence to demonstrate the association between financial development and 
corporate investment efficiency. Our results show that through fixing both under-investment 
and over-investment problems, improvement in financial development is conducive to 
investment efficiency. 
Understanding the main reasons that cause investment inefficiency will help to formulate 
policies that can address the problem. Various factors contribute to this anomaly.
*
 These 
factors can broadly be classified as; 1) internal factors, which are within the domain of 
managerial influence; and 2) external factors, which are generally beyond the control of 
managerial ambit. Under the perfect-capital-market hypothesis of Modigliani and Miller 
(1958), in the presence of frictionless markets, it is irrelevant whether a firm finances its 
investments from internal or external sources. However, due to the existence of imperfect 
capital markets and information asymmetries between different stakeholders, firms are not 
                                                 
*
 Shleifer and Vishny (1997) provide an extensive survey on these factors. 
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treated equally in capital markets. Indeed, some firms are more creditworthy for lenders and 
they are willing to extend credit at lower rates than to less-creditworthy firms (Cole, 1998; 
Diamond, 1984).  Firms that face difficulty in obtaining financing from financial markets at 
attractive rates (or sometimes fail to obtain funding at any rates at all) are considered as 
‘financially constrained firms’. Fazzari et al. (1988) point out that financially constrained 
firms frequently have to rely on internally generated funds for investments. Inclusion of debt 
in capital structure enables firms to leverage their potential with limited capital amount. Due 
to the inability to raise debt externally, and when internal funds are scarce, some firms are 
unable to invest in many positive Net Present Value (NPV) projects and must forgo profitable 
growth opportunities. Incapability of getting funds competitively in the external markets 
together with finite internal funds, hinder firm growth. Such firms consequently face the issue 
of under-investment.  
Despite a strong support in literature claiming that financing cost is the main determinant 
of investment decisions, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) argue that financing cost is not the only 
driver for investment decisions. They posit that managers choose costly financing even when 
cheaper financing options are readily available. The conscientious choice of costly options 
for investments suggests a conflict of interest between managers and shareholders. This 
conflict is encompassed by the Agency Theory as stipulated by Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
Some major causes of conflict of interest between owners and managers, with respect to 
investment, are: empire building preferences (Jensen, 1986), short-termism (Bebchuk & 
Stole, 1993; Stein, 1989), own career concerns (Holmström, 1999) and overconfidence 
(Malmendier & Tate, 2005). These conflicts are often discerned by over investment of firms’ 
resources in unprofitable projects that subsequently causes a fall in firm value. Hence, in the 
presence of agency issues, financing constraints are not the only factors that lead to 
investment inefficiency, over-investment also weakens investment efficiency by wasting 
firms’ resources owing to misalignment of principal-agent interests. This study shares Zhang 
et al. (2016)’s definition of investment efficiency which refers to the situation where the 
degree of over-investment and under-investment in firms are reduced from previous years. 
Alternatively, investment inefficiency arises when over-investment and under-investment are 
kept unchecked.  
It has been observed that financing constraints and agency issues are more prominent in 
economies which have less-developed capital markets, fewer numbers of financial 
institutions, less stringent laws and regulations, and ineffective monitoring and transparency 
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mechanisms (King & Levine, 1993a; La Porta et al., 1998; Levine, 2005). Since, these 
characteristics are largely the constituents of a country’s financial structure; it implies that 
financing and agency problems faced by firms will be less prevalent in countries which make 
advancement towards financial development. According to Levine (2005), financial 
development involves a set of financial system (e.g. banks, capital markets, banking laws and 
regulations) that mainly plays a role in reducing barriers to financing, providing monitoring 
mechanisms and lowering cost of acquiring financial information. 
Financial development could impact corporate investment in various ways. For instance, 
financial development helps to channel capital from suppliers to users more smoothly, thus 
mitigating the financing constraints faced by firms. Brown and Petersen (2009) find that 
firms, including the smaller ones who are most likely to be financially constrained, are able to 
raise funds with less friction through equity financing in developed financial markets. Levine 
(2005) argues that large number of financial intermediaries operate in countries with high 
level of financial development means more funds suppliers are available to provide funds 
which reduces the cost of financing due to increase in competition among lenders.   
 Love (2003) highlights that improvement in financial development addresses 
information asymmetries between funds suppliers and funds seekers, which helps to reduce 
the financing constraints in a firm. In sum, through improvement in financial markets, 
financial development could have an impact on investment efficiency of firms by providing 
greater availability of fund suppliers, thus lessening its financing constraints; and reducing 
information asymmetries between fund users. Based on these conjectures, this study predicts 
that financial development will address the under-investment issue in firms that are 
financially constrained. Furthermore, financial development aids to improve efficient 
allocation of funds through proper evaluation and monitoring mechanisms. Expropriation of 
funds by firm managers are less likely in countries with developed financial systems as 
monitoring of managers is more effective in such countries (Levine, 2005; Masahiro et al., 
2018). Developed financial markets have a large number of formal and informal institutions 
who regularly monitor and evaluate corporate actions. These institutions ensure that a 
publicly traded company adheres to the high standards of transparency and corporate 
responsibility. This eliminates the need for individual monitoring by small investors which 
stimulates investors’ confidence. Proper monitoring ensures that firms’ resources are not 
wasted on investment in dubious projects. Therefore, it is plausible that improvements in 
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financial development mitigate the over-investment issue faced by firms. Based on this 
premise, this study expects that financial development will alleviate the over-investment 
problem that is caused by agency issues. 
This study contributes to the existing literature in two major ways. Firstly, a newly 
constructed over-investment measure is used in the study. Previous studies on over-
investment are mostly based on firms’ cash flow and leverage conditions. We maintain that 
firm size is an important determinant of over-investment in firms. Researchers, such as 
Almeida and Campello (2007) and Hadlock and Pierce (2010), also stress the importance of 
firm size in gaining easy access to external funding. Therefore, the exclusion of firm size can 
affect the unbiased categorization of firms that are more prone to over-investing. Secondly, 
we extend the literature on financial development and investment efficiency. Guariglia and 
Yang (2016) show that financing and agency issues cause under- and over-investment in 
firms respectively, while, Castro et al. (2015) and Khan et al. (2017) find that financial 
development affect investment decisions of firms. We extend this line of investigation by 
adding insights into how investment efficiency is improved through the various aspects of 
financial development, i.e. how it addresses under-investment, over-investment or both 
problems. Moreover, with the advancement in the financial structure of a country, we unravel 
how financing and agency issues are being rectified. This is an area with limited prior 
research.  
This study utilizes a Fixed Effects analysis on an unbalanced panel of 11,015 non-
financial listed firms in the 35 OECD member countries over the period 1990 -2015 collected 
annually. Through the testing of three hypotheses, our results suggest that 1) financial 
development has a positive and significant impact on corporate investment, 2) financial 
development helps to mitigate the under-investment issue in financially constrained firms, 
and 3) financial development helps to address over-investment problem in firms that are 
facing agency issues. Our findings propose that these positive effects of financial 
development on corporate investment decisions are achieved through its monitoring and 
financing mechanisms. Checks for robustness are performed through alternative 
specifications and our findings remain mostly unchanged. 
2. The Three Hypotheses 
We perform our investigation progressively through the testing of three hypotheses. The 
first hypothesis aims to establish a general relationship between financial development and 
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corporate investment, it is then followed by two further hypotheses that investigate how 
financial development mitigates financial inefficiencies that are instigated by financial 
constraints and agency problems individually.   
2.1. Financial Development and Corporate Investment  
 Rajan and Zingales (1998) find that financial development reduces the financing costs 
of a firm, which has positive implications for firm growth. Financial development can also 
impact corporate investment through other means such as, by lowering transactions costs, by 
channeling savings to the firms, enhancing innovative activities, and removing the barriers to 
exchanges of transactions (Hsu et al., 2014; Levine, 2005). This study predicts that, besides 
addressing investment inefficiencies as discussed later on, as a whole, corporate investment 
of firms will increase in an economy with the progress in the financial development of a 
country. Hypothesis 1 of the study tests this notion: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Overall, financial development increases level of corporate investment 
in a country.  
2.2. Financial Constraints, Investment Efficiency, and Financial Development 
Financial condition of a firm is initially overlooked in the literature since it is assumed that 
in a market without frictions and information asymmetry problems, it is irrelevant how an 
investment project is financed (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). This assumption implies that the 
difference in financing costs between internal and external sources is trivial. However, when 
the perfect market assumption is relaxed, it is realized that the financial condition of a firm 
becomes an important deliberation while undertaking investment decisions (Myers, 1977; 
Myers & Majluf, 1984).  
 Fazzari et al. (1988) (hereinafter FHP) also point out that the financial condition of a 
firm determines how its investment projects are financed. They find that firms that have 
difficulty in obtaining external funding (financially constrained firms), use internal cash 
flows to pursue their investment goals. Other studies (e.g., Campello et al., 2010; Guariglia, 
2008; Hubbard, 1998; Kashyap et al., 1994; Mulier et al., 2016; Whited, 1992) find consistent 
support for FHP and maintain that the dearth of resources, especially externally, is a reason 
which results in the distortion of investment decisions. FHP’s proposition suggests that firms 
that face obstacles in obtaining external financing will look inwardly to meet investment 
requirements. Since, these internal resources are limited; it is not possible for firms to exploit 
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all investable opportunities. Thus, the inability to raise external financing at low capital costs 
precludes firms to achieve investment efficiency. Investment deficiency in this case can be 
termed as ‘under-investment’ which has adverse effects on a firm’s future value. Based on 
this premise, it is assumed that firms will suffer from under-investment when faced with 
financial constraints. 
Inasmuch, under-investment as a form of investment inefficiency mainly due to the 
difficulty in raising external finances from outside sources; financial development in a 
country can tackle the issue by reducing the frictions and barriers faced by firms in obtaining 
external financing, vis-à-vis, financial development induces investment efficiency by easing 
the financial burden of financially constrained firms.  
 Love (2003) analyses the association between investment efficiency and financial 
development and observes that financial development improves investment efficiency by 
reducing financing constraints in firms. Financial development largely imparts its benefits of 
removing financing constraints through development in capital markets and the banking 
sector. Improvements in financial markets reduce frictions for firms to finance their 
investment projects through banks loans and equity-financing. Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1998) show that in countries with high legal and financial development, 
because of an increase in competitions among banks, long-term loans become more attractive 
to firms. Brown and Petersen (2009) empirically investigate investment-cash flow sensitivity 
and equity markets development, and find that this sensitivity has diminished over time, 
indicating an improvement in the financial condition of a firm. They suggest that 
development in equity markets is a reason for the decline in the degree of financing 
constraints of firms. Marcelin and Mathur (2014) also highlight that financing costs are low 
in countries with strong legal and financial institutional base. These prior studies indicate that 
financial development has positive implications for financially constrained firms. Therefore, 
it is reasonable to expect that financial development will help to lessen the difficulties 
experienced by firms which are financially constrained and are under-investing, hence, an 
inverse relationship is likely to be observed. Based on this conjecture, we predict a second 
testable hypothesis as follows:  
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Financial development reduces investment inefficiency by negatively 
impacting under-investment in financially constrained firms. 
2.3. Agency Issues, Investment Efficiency, and Financial Development 
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Agency Theory stipulates the conflict of interest between managers (agent) and 
shareholders (principal); where the agent, who have a control over firms’ resources will work 
for their self- interest at the expense of the principal (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Stein (2003) 
highlights agency issues between different stakeholders that cause investment inefficiencies. 
He suggests that the dominant role of agency theory in affecting investment decisions is 
through promoting over-investment in the firm. These underlying agency issues include 
empire building, overconfidence, career motives, herding behavior and short-termism (e.g. 
Bebchuk & Stole, 1993; Holmström, 1999; Jensen, 1986; Malmendier & Tate, 2005).
†
 In 
particular, almost all of these agency issues lead to over-investment by managers thereby 
inflicting investment efficiency in a negative way. Although, it is difficult to directly measure 
the existence and intensity of agency problems that cause over-investment in firms, a number 
of researchers have documented evidences predominantly linking the presence of high level 
of free cash flow with over-investment (such as, Bates, 2005; Blanchard et al., 1994; 
Guariglia & Yang, 2016; Jensen, 1986; Richardson, 2006, among others). Based upon agency 
theory, it is probable that firms that are facing agency problems will over-invest their 
resources in projects with or without justifiable returns. 
It has been suggested that the underlying cause for agency issues is due to a failure of 
corporate governance in firms (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Corporate governance concerns are 
also translated into financial market misconducts which exacerbate agency issues (see 
Cumming et al., 2017 for an overview). Financial development can help to re-align the goals 
of different stakeholders by reinforcing effective corporate governance mechanism. This is 
because; through advancement in the banking and stock market sectors, financial 
development can enhance the monitoring and transparency mechanisms. Masahiro et al. 
(2018) also point out that earning managements in firms are reduced with increase in the 
financial development of a country. 
The role of banks in monitoring managers and thereby firms cannot be undermined. Since 
some shareholders are generally unable to understand financial information, they regularly 
rely on others to analyze and monitor firms. Beck and Levine (2004) maintain that, even if 
these investors have the expertise to comprehend and study complex data, they are still at the 
mercy of managers who control the flow of information. Banks come to the rescue in such 
                                                 
†
 Although, short-termism can also lead to under-investment as suggested by Stein (1989). Another agency issue 
which is also linked with under-investment is risk aversion as indicated by Lambrecht and Myers (2017). 
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case as they have incentives and capabilities to suitably monitor the actions of managers. The 
survival of banks is much dependent upon the loans they extend to customers, thus, banks 
closely monitor managers to assess the sustainability of firms. Hoshi et al. (1990, 1990b) also 
empirically provide evidence about the importance of this intermediation in monitoring 
managers and the resultant reduction in agency issues. Similarly, Qian and Yeung (2015) find 
that corporate governance practices of firms can be badly affected when banks fail to 
effectively monitor them.  
In some instances when bank monitoring is ineffective, capital markets can offer remedial 
functions. Wurgler (2000) finds that development in financial markets helps to curb agency 
issues of over-investment and improve allocation of capital. He notices that in countries with 
high financial development, firms allocate resources efficiently and increase (decrease)
‡
 
investment in growing (declining) industries. This efficient allocation is due to the reduction 
in information asymmetries and the increase in protection of investors in financial developed 
countries. Moreover, Boyd and Smith (1998) illustrate that banks and the equity markets 
support each other and financial development is achieved through the co-evolution and 
development in both sectors. 
Studies noted thus far demonstrate that development in both banking and stock markets 
renders effective monitoring and controlling mechanisms. These functions of financial 
development have positive ramifications for improving investment efficiency by reducing 
agency problems. Therefore, it is expected that firms that are over-investing will cut their 
investment spending as financial development occurs. Accordingly, this study predicts that: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3). Financial development reduces investment inefficiency by negatively 
impacting over-investment in firms that have agency issues. 
 Figure I summarizes the background of our three testable hypotheses. The diagram shows 
that ceteris paribus financial constraints and agency issues contribute to the problem of 
investment inefficiency. Financial constraint issues are most likely to bring on under-
investment in firms whereas; agency problems foster managers to over-invest. With a low 
level of financial development, the under-investment and over-investment problems will lead 
to investment inefficiency. Financial development in a country can address investment 
inefficiency in firms through its financing and monitoring functions. Financial development 
                                                 
‡
 Lambrecht and Myers (2007) provide a useful theoretical and empirical study on the reasons for disinvestment 
in declining industries. 
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also impacts corporate investment through other means such as; by lowering transactions 
costs, channeling savings to the firms, enhancing innovative activities, and removing the 
barriers to exchanges of transactions. 
[insert Figure 1 here] 
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Figure I. Conceptual Framework 
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3. Research Design 
3.1. Over-Investment – A New Measure 
An improved measure of over-investment is constructed in this study. Biddle et al. (2009) 
employ a ranking variable based on the amount of cash flow and level of debt of firms to 
measure the likelihood of over-investment. They suggest that firms which have higher amount of 
cash and low level of debt are prone to over-investing. This is because; a control over higher 
amount of cash flow coupled with lower debt saturation tempts managers to pursue their own 
agendas which results in over-investment. In the similar vein, lower values of this ranking 
variable could be taken as a proxy for under-investment. 
Intuitively, this variable used in Biddle et al. (2009) depends upon the accessibility of external 
funds. Lower amount of debt and higher amount of cash flow improves the capacity of firms to 
obtain funding from external markets at attractive rates. For that, bigger firms are generally 
favored over smaller firms in the external markets. Almeida and Campello (2007) stress the 
importance of firm size in gaining an easy access to the external markets for funding 
requirements. They suggest that bigger firms have greater accessibility to financing sources than 
smaller ones. Similarly, Hadlock and Pierce (2010) also argue that financial accessibility is 
difficult to measure when firm size is ignored. 
Moreover, small firms, which have huge amount of cash flows and low level of debt, can be 
termed as over-investing firms by Biddle et al. (2009). We believe that this cannot be necessarily 
true, as small firms have extensive growth opportunities can invest aggressively without being 
indulging in over-investment. Although,  is likely to capture over-investment tendencies in firms, 
financing availability and growth opportunities owing to firm size can affect the unbiased 
categorization of firms based only on cash flow and leverage amount. Ranking of firms solely on 
the basis of cash and debt can overstate the probability of over-investment in such firms and it 
can potentially lead to biased measurements of over-investment. Therefore, we propose that firm 
size, which is measured by the amount of total assets, can resolve the issue by placing bigger 
firms in categories that are likely to over-invest. Our new measure is expected to be robust, as at 
one end, it will be unbiased for small firms, and on the other, it can also account for bigger firms 
appropriately. Therefore, our measure considers that CEOs, who are managing larger firms, and 
have large amount of cash and low level of debt at their disposal, are more prone to involve in 
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over-investment activities than otherwise. In sum, our new construct Over_investment is based 
on the values of three firm level variables, i.e., cash holdings, amount of debt and firm size. 
Firms that score high on these three variables are more likely to over-invest and vice versa. 
3.2. Model Specifications 
The three hypotheses developed in this study are tested through the use of three equations. 
Corporate investment and financial development 
 The relationship between corporate investment and financial development of a country as 
outlined in H1 is estimated by the following regression equation: 
Corp_investment
i,t
= α + β
1 
Fin_development
c,t-1 
+ β
2 
Cash
i,t-1 
+ β
3 
Sales
i,t-1
+ β
4 
Fin_leverage
i,t-1            
+ β
5 
Firm_size
i,t-1
+β
6 
Tangibility
i,t-1
+β
7 
TobinQ
i,t-1
+β
8 
Slack
i,t-1
+β
9 
Loss
i,t-1 
+ β
10 
Dividend
i,t-1 
+ ε
i,t
               (1) 
In Eq. (1), the subscripts c, i and t denote country, firm and year respectively. Dependent 
variable Corp_investment is the amount of corporate investment of a firm and is measured as the 
ratio of capital expenditures to the beginning of year total assets and multiplied by 100. 
Independent variable Fin_development represents financial development of a country and is 
measured as a standard deviation of sum of credit provided by banks and stock market 
capitalization to the GDP. Consistent with previous studies, e.g., Biddle et al. (2009) and 
Guariglia and Yang (2016), a set of control variables are also included in the model. Cash is the 
amount of cash and cash equivalents of a firm divided by lagged total assets. Sales is the sales 
revenue of a firm divided by lagged total assets. Fin_leverage is the sum of long-term debt and 
short-term debt and divided by lagged total assets. Firm_size is measured by the market 
capitalization of a firm divided by lagged total assets, while; Tangibility is the ratio of property, 
plant and equipment to lagged total assets. TobinQ is computed as the market-to-book ratio of 
assets and measures the growth opportunities of firms. We also control for other firm 
characteristics such as financial slack, loss and dividends after Myers and Majluf (1984). They 
suggest that firms with higher financial slack, no ex ante loss and higher dividend are able to 
invest more than their counterparts. Hence, Slack measures the financial slackness of the firm 
and is a ratio of cash to property, plant, and equipment, Loss is a dummy variable that takes the 
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value of ‘1’ if the earnings before extraordinary items are negative and zero otherwise, and, 
Dividend is also a dummy variable which takes the value of ‘1’ when a firm pays a dividend or 
else zero. Finally, ε
i,t
 is idiosyncratic error term. To alleviate the potential simultaneity problem, 
we lag all our independent variables. Description of variables together with their expected 
directions of relationship with the dependent variable are presented in Table 1. 
3.3. Investment Efficiency and Financial Development 
The relationship between investment efficiency and financial development is investigated in 
multiple ways. Both H2 and H3 are firstly examined through the use of Eq. (2), which is adapted 
after Biddle et al. (2009). H2 is then further analyzed by dividing the sample according to the 
Kaplan and Zingales index (KZ index), while H3 utilizes a methodology of Richardson (2006) 
and Guariglia and Yang (2016) to verify the hypothesized relationship. The two different 
methods are used according to how the hypotheses are constructed. We use KZ index due to two 
reasons; a) it is the most cited measure of financial constraints in the literature according to 
google scholar citations, and b) KZ index employs the same concept of identifying constrained 
firms that is close to our study. KZ index identifies firms as financially constrained that have less 
cash and high leverage, while Whited and Wu (2006) and Hadlock and Pierce (2010) indexes 
classify firms as constrained that are characterized by less leverage, are younger and smaller 
(Farre-Mensa & Ljungqvist, 2016).  Details of the KZ index and Richardson’s model are 
presented in Appendix A.  
H2 and H3: Eq. (2) 
Corp_investment
i,t
= α + β
1 
Fin_development
c,t-1 
+ β
2
 Fin_development
c,t-1
×Over_investment
i,t
   
+β
3
 Cash
i,t-1 
+β
4 
Sales
i,t-1
+ β
5 
Fin_leverage
 i,t-1
+ β
6 
Firm_size
 i,t-1 
            
+β
7 
Tangibility
i,t-1
+ β
8 
TobinQ
i,t-1
+ β
9 
Slack
i,t-1 
+ β
10 
Loss
i,t-1                                    
+ β
11 
Dividend
 i,t-1 
+ ε
i,t
               (2) 
All variables except Over_investment have been explained previously. Over_investment is a 
ranking variable based on the values of cash flow, debt and assets. This variable has a value 
between 0 and 1 with higher values are associated with the likelihood of over-investing. Firms 
that have abundance amount of cash and total assets, but low-levels of debt are assigned higher 
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rankings in this Over_investment variable. This is because such firms not only have huge amount 
of internal resources at their disposal, but also have better accessibility to external financing, thus 
more likely to over-invest.  
It is predicted that financial development will increase (decrease) corporate investment in 
firms that are under-investing (over-investing). β1 and the sum of β1 and β2 will indicate the 
impact of financial development on corporate investment of firms conditional on the values of 
the Over_investment variable. 
β1 in Eq. (2) captures the relationship between corporate investment and financial 
development when Over_investment equals to zero, i.e. when under-investment is most likely. 
Therefore, it is predicted that β1 will be positive and significant, which signals financial 
development helps to ease the financing burden of financially constrained firms, therefore more 
corporate investment. 
As Over_investment is an incremental variable with values ranging between 0 and 1, the sum 
of be β1 and β2 is expected to be negative when Over_investment equals to 1 (i.e., over-
investment is most likely). Furthermore, due to an anticipated increase in monitoring, as a result 
of financial development, it will lessen agency issues in firms which should reduce over-
investment in them. Therefore, it is expected that the sum of these two coefficients will be 
negative and significant when over-investment is most likely (such that β1 + β2 < 0). Intuitively, it 
is predicted that β2 will also have a negative and significant impact on determining 
Corp_investment.  
Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) are estimated by the panel Fixed Effects and Random Effects models. 
Hausman test is applied to select a suitable estimation technique between these two models. The 
significant value of Hausman test suggests that Fixed Effects model is the more appropriate one 
to utilize. We control for country, firm and year fixed effects to address the differences of macro-
economic variability among countries, global shocks in a year and firms’ individual differences. 
This approach also largely addresses a potential impact of financial crisis on our analysis. 
Moreover, robust standard errors are clustered at country level and are calculated to account for 
heteroscedasticity, auto-correlation and serial-correlation (Petersen, 2009). Additionally, as 
suggested by Guariglia and Yang (2016), lagged values of the regressors are used in the 
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estimations to remove the influence of simultaneity. Table 1 presents a summary description of 
variables. 
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Symbol Description Measurement 
Expected 
Relationship 
Dependent variable 
Corp_investment Corporate investment 
Capital expenditures (Capex) divided by lagged total assets and 
multiplied by 100. 
 
Independent variables 
*
Fin_development
 Financial development of a 
country 
Sum of credit by banks and stock market capitalization divided 
by GDP. 
+ 
Over_investment Firms that are more likely to 
overinvest 
Ranking variable with values between 0 and 1 and is based on 
high-cash, high assets and low-debt value. 
− 
*
Bank_development Development of a bank Private credit by banks divided by GDP. + 
*
Stock_development Development of a stock 
market 
Stock market capitalization divided by GDP. + 
Control variables    
Cash Cash Cash and cash equivalents of firms divided by lagged total assets.  + 
Sales Sales revenue of a firm Net sales revenue divided by lagged total assets. + 
Fin_leverage Financial leverage of a firm Sum of long-term debt and short-term debt and divided by lagged 
total assets.  
− 
Firm_size  Size of a firm Market capitalization to the lagged total assets value of a firm. + 
Tangibility Tangibility of a firm Ratio of property, plant and equipment to the lagged total assets. + 
TobinQ Tobin’s Q Market value of assets divided by book value of assets, calculated 
as shares outstanding × price – deferred taxes/total assets.  
+ 
Slack Financial slack Ratio of cash to lagged property, plant and equipment value. − 
Loss Loss incurred by firm A dummy variable with the value of one if income before 
extraordinary items is negative, zero otherwise. 
− 
Dividend Dividend paid by firm A dummy variable with the value of one if a firm pays dividends, 
zero otherwise. 
+ 
*
Variables measured in terms of standard deviation.  
All other control variables except Loss and Dividend are measured as ratios.  
Data source: World Bank Financial Structure Dataset and Datastream. 
Table 1. Variable Definition and Expected Relationship 
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H2: Eq. (3) 
H2 is further confirmed by dividing the sample according to the Kaplan and Zingales (KZ) 
index. The KZ index is developed by Lamont et al. (2001) by using the dataset of Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997). The index employs different accounting measures to gauge the level of financial 
constraints faced by the firms. Higher values are attributed to firms that are financially 
constrained and, hence, having obstacles in raising financing, and are likely to under-invest. H2 
predicts that the financial condition of a firm is expected to improve in parallel with 
developments in the financial system of a country. It is, therefore anticipated that firms in the 
upper quartiles as per KZ index (i.e. financially constrained firms) will exhibit a positive 
relationship with corporate investment in the presence of financial development. To test this 
prediction, Eq. (2) is modified and becomes Eq. (3) as follows: 
Corp_investment
i,t
= α + β
1 
Fin_development
c,t-1 
+ β
2
 Fin_development
c,t-1
×Fin_constraints
i,t
     
+β
3
 Cash
i,t-1 
+β
4 
Sales
i,t-1
+ β
5 
Fin_leverage
 i,t-1
+ β
6 
Firm_size
 i,t-1 
            
+β
7 
Tangibility
i,t-1
+ β
8 
TobinQ
i,t-1
+ β
9 
Slack
i,t-1 
+ β
10 
Loss
i,t-1                                    
+ β
11 
Dividend
 i,t-1 
+ ε
i,t
 
 
             (3) 
Where, Fin_constraints represents firms’ financial constraints and is based on KZ index4 
value of more than and equal to the median value which is -2.37 (un-tabulated). All other 
variables have been defined previously. It is expected that the sum of coefficient of 
Fin_development (β1) and interaction term Fin_development×Fin_constraints (β2) will be 
positive and significant such that β1 + β2 > 0. Fixed Effects estimators are obtained for Eq. (3) 
with robust standard errors. 
H3: Eq. (4) 
A methodology of Richardson (2006) and Guariglia and Yang (2016) is used to confirm the 
findings of H3. By predicting the amount of cash flow that are beyond the levels necessary for 
undertaking and pursuing positive NPV investment projects, Richardson (2006) develops a 
model to measure agency cost which causes over-investment. 
                                                 
4
 The construction of KZ index is describe in Appendix A. 
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To analyze the relationship between over-investment and financial development of a country, 
our sample is divided according to free cash flow and abnormal investment. Firms that have 
positive values of these two cases represent the situation of excess free cash flow and over-
investment. In our sample, 8,236 firms meet this criterion. The following equation is used to 
confirm the earlier findings of the H3: 
  Abn_investment
i,t
= α + β
1 
Fin_development
c,t-1 
+ β
2
 Fin_development
c,t-1
×Free_CF
i,t
              
+β
3
 Cash
i,t-1 
+β
4 
Sales
i,t-1
+ β
5 
Fin_leverage
 i,t-1
+ β
6 
Firm_size
 i,t-1 
            
+β
7 
Tangibility
i,t-1
+ β
8 
TobinQ
i,t-1
+ β
9 
Slack
i,t-1 
+ β
10 
Loss
i,t-1                                    
+ β
11 
Dividend
 i,t-1 
+ ε
i,t
                           (4) 
Where, Abn_investment is the unexpected investment and Free_CF is the amount of free cash 
flow.
5
 All other variables are defined previously. Both Abn_investment and Free_CF have values 
greater than zero. Again, the findings of H3 will be consistent if the sum of coefficients of 
Fin_development (β1) and its interaction term Fin_development×Free_CF (β2) is found to be 
negative and significant (i.e. β1 + β2 < 0). We again use fixed effects estimators with robust 
standard errors for Eq. 4.  
3.4. Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
35 member countries in ‘The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’ 
(OECD) are selected for this study.
6
 The dataset includes a rather comprehensive set of industrial 
countries that will provide important insights while analyzing the impact of financial 
development in affecting investment efficiency than focusing on a single country like the US. 
Further, information collected from the OECD countries could offer more reliability to statistical 
analysis. The main data sources are Datastream and World Bank Financial Structure Dataset. 
Data about financial variables is collected from Datastream, while, macro-data is collected from 
World Development Indicators (WDI) published by the World Bank Financial Structure Dataset.  
 We exclude financial firms (SIC codes ranging from 6000 to 6999) from the data as financial 
firms have different accounting measures and the nature of their investment is different. Our 
                                                 
5
 The measurement of Abn_investment and Free_CF are explained in detail in the Appendix A. 
6
 Dataset consists of all member countries as on January 2018. Lithuania joined the OECD afterwards on July 5, 
2018. List of countries is provided in Table A1 of Appendix A. 
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final dataset involves an unbalanced panel of 11,015 non-financial listed firms through 1990 to 
2015 as the data beyond these years are not available for most countries. We collected the data 
on annual basis and all variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles to mitigate the 
effect of outliers. 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of all the variables used in this study.
7
 Corp_investment 
has a mean and median value of 6.86 percent and 3.98 percent respectively, and a standard 
deviation of 9.24, which is the highest following Slack, and it infers a relatively large fluctuation 
in firm investments. The mean value of Corp_investment suggests that listed firms in the OECD 
countries are investing, on average, at the rate of seven percent of the total assets. These values 
are consistent with Julio and Yook (2012) for a set of international countries. Fin_development 
offers us a total of 443,613 observations which is the largest amongst all variables. It measures 
the sum of banking development and stock market development in a country, and its minimum 
and maximum values are 4.89 and 11.02 respectively. Since our sample encompasses 35 OECD 
countries, a standard deviation of 1.07 for Fin_development shows that changes in the financial 
systems of these countries have remained rather stable during our sample period.  
[insert Table 2 here] 
                                                 
7
 The correlation matrix is provided in Table A2 of Appendix A. 
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  Obs. Mean S.D. Min P25
th
 Median P75
th
 Max 
Corp_investment   220,970  6.86 9.24 0.05 1.74 3.98 8.11 81.77 
Fin_development   443,613  9.31 1.07 4.89 8.72 9.57 10.08 11.02 
Over_investment   193,129  0.28 0.13 0.00 0.18 0.28 0.37 0.72 
Cash   233,218  0.21 0.31 0.00 0.05 0.11 0.25 1.50 
Sales   224,422  1.14 0.81 0.00 0.60 1.00 1.49 5.08 
Fin_leverage   198,310  0.27 0.23 0.00 0.11 0.24 0.39 1.09 
Firm_size   229,292  12.26 2.38 5.55 10.69 12.35 13.91 17.79 
Tangibility   229,452  0.32 0.20 0.00 0.12 0.28 0.49 1.09 
TobinQ   161,934  0.97 0.95 0.04 0.36 0.67 1.21 6.65 
Slack   241,234 2.30 5.85 0.00 0.13 0.43 1.49 50.10 
Loss   257,360 0.26 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Dividend   239,621 0.55 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
The table describes descriptive statistics of winsorized data at 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. Corp_investment is measured as a ratio of 
capital expenditures to the beginning of year total assets and multiplied by 100. Independent variable Fin_development is measured 
as a standard deviation of sum of credit provided by banks and stock market capitalization to the GDP. Cash is the amount of cash 
and cash equivalents of a firm divided by lagged total assets. Sales is the sales revenue of a firm divided by lagged total assets. 
Fin_leverage is the sum of long-term debt and short-term debt and divided by lagged total assets. Firm_size is measured by the 
market capitalization of a firm divided by lagged total assets, while; Tangibility is the ratio of property, plant and equipment to 
lagged total assets. TobinQ is computed as the market-to-book ratio of assets and measures the growth opportunities of firms. Slack 
measures the financial slackness of the firm and is a ratio of cash to property, plant, and equipment. Loss is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of ‘1’ if the earnings before extraordinary items are negative and zero otherwise. Dividend is also a dummy 
variable, which takes the value of ‘1’ when a firm pays a dividend or else zero. Description of variables are presented in Table 1.  
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics  
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4. Empirical results 
4.1. H1: Overall, financial development improves level of corporate investment in a country.  
 Table 3 reports estimation results of Eq. (1) which is aimed to analyze the relationship 
between corporate investment and financial development through the testing of H1. It is found 
that financial development is positively associated with corporate investment at 1 percent 
significance level (β1 = 0.209, t-stat = 2.97). It implies that, improving Fin_development by one 
standard deviation is likely to increase Corp_investment by approximately 0.209 percent in 
OECD non-financial firms. This finding lends support to H1. The correlations of our control 
variables with the dependent variable are also in congruence with previous studies (e.g., Biddle 
et al., 2009; Guariglia & Yang, 2016; Lara et al., 2016). 
 H1 tests the prediction that financial development is an important impetus for firm 
investments. The result confirms this prediction. This is because as the financial system develops, 
costs and frictions to obtain financing are reduced. Firms, including those that previously 
encountered difficulties in obtaining financing from external markets, are able to get the required 
funding.  Removing the barriers to financing increases capital spending which boosts firm 
investments. Based on this evidence, it can be inferred that the financial development helps to 
increase investments activities in an economy. Our findings here are consistent with the view 
that financial development helps to promote economic growth of a country. For instance, Hsu et 
al. (2014) show that higher financial development is associated with increased research and 
development spending in 32 countries. In a larger context, Beck and Levine (2004) document 
that financial development improves the growth of the economy by reducing financing barriers 
for firms. While recently, Castro et al. (2015) demonstrate that improvement in financial 
development increases the supply of capital to the firms that are financially constrained.   
 The result of this estimated relationship is depicted in Figure II. The figure shows that 
Corp_investment is positively related to Fin_development. Overall, it is evident in the regression 
plots that the high values of investment spending are associated with the increase in the level of 
financial development. 
[insert Table 3 here] 
[insert Figure II here]  
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 Eq. (1) Eq. (2) Eq. (3) Eq.(4) 
 H1 H2, H3 H2 H3 
Fin_development 0.209*** 0.423*** 0.287** −0.001 
 (2.97) (3.85) (2.08) (−0.40) 
Fin_development×Over_investment  −1.324***   
  (−3.43)   
Fin_development×Fin_constraints   0.034*  
   (1.89)  
Fin_development×Free_CF    −0.022** 
    (−2.10) 
Joint impact (β1 + β2)  −0.902*** 0.321** −0.023*** 
  (−2.94) (2.24) (−2.74) 
Cash 1.818*** 2.860*** 4.803*** 0.150*** 
 (6.26) (9.10) (3.37) (12.84) 
Sales 0.416*** 0.382*** 1.318*** 0.067*** 
 (5.38) (4.95) (3.88) (9.25) 
Fin_leverage −2.100*** −2.400*** −3.691*** 0.015 
 (−10.86) (−12.85) (−4.67) (0.84) 
Firm_size −1.662*** −1.283*** −1.993*** 0.105*** 
 (−20.71) (−17.97) (−9.11) (5.83) 
Tangibility 5.148*** 5.177*** 4.174*** −0.326*** 
 (15.16) (15.25) (5.00) (−20.27) 
TobinQ 1.635*** 1.613*** 2.383*** −0.018*** 
 (26.15) (25.34) (10.16) (−5.02) 
Slack −0.023*** −0.021*** −0.381*** −0.001* 
 (−3.47) (−3.11) (−4.52) (−1.82) 
Loss −0.796*** −0.854*** −0.887*** −0.015** 
 (−13.85) (−15.15) (−4.81) (−2.05) 
Dividend 0.634*** 0.655*** 0.200 −0.005 
 (8.00) (8.49) (0.87) (−1.26) 
Constant 25.24*** 21.30*** 32.48*** −1.59*** 
 (24.53) (23.25) (11.10) (−6.96) 
Firm fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
Country fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
Time fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
Observations 107,809 104,895 15,882 64,799 
Firms 10,909 10,681 3,123 8,160 
Adjusted R-squared 0.147 0.152 0.165 0.071 
Data is collected from Datastream and World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). 
Corp_investment is a dependent variable and is measured by a ratio of capital expenditure to the lagged 
total assets value. Fin_constraints is constructed on the value of KZ index, while, Free_CF is based on 
positive value of free cash flow after deducing the expected investment and maintenance amount. All 
other variables have been explained in Table 1. t-statistics are in parentheses and are based on robust 
standard errors.  
***
p<0.01, 
**
p<0.05,
 *
p<0.10. 
Table 3. Regression Results between Corporate Investment and Financial Development 
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Figure II. Regression Relationship (Hypothesis H1). The figure shows the relationship 
between residuals of Corp_investment and Financial development. Data is collected from 
Datastream and World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). 
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4.2. H2: Financial development reduces investment inefficiency by inversely impacting under-
investment in financially constrained firms. 
Through the use of Eq. (2), H2 tests the inverse relationship between corporate investment 
and financial development, in firms that are financially constrained and are likely to under-
invest. Estimation results in Table 3 show that Fin_development is positively and statistically 
linked to Corp_investment at 1 percent significance level (β1 = 0.423, t-stat = 3.85), when 
Over_investment is likely to be zero. It implies that, all else being constant, a one standard 
deviation increase in Fin_development can increase Corp_investment (and thus decrease under-
investment) by approximately 0.423 percent in firms that are financially constrained. Consistent 
with the prediction, financial development of a country helps to improve the under-investment 
issue by inducing more investment in firms that are facing financing problems. This finding 
supports H2 as discussed in preceding section of Model Specification. 
A probable explanation of this relationship might be due to the improvement in credit 
availability in a financially developed country. This could be conducted through two channels: 1) 
banking, and 2) stock markets. Firstly, financial development brings about large number of banks 
and other financial intermediaries to the country, which helps to smooth the flow of funds to 
users. This benefit extends to firms that are financially constrained and provides them with 
greater opportunities to obtain financing with less friction due to competition among banks. 
Easing of financing burden is likely to increase corporate investment spending of such firms. 
Barkat and Zuobao (2017) also indicate that banks help to grow firms faster than other informal 
sources of finance. 
Secondly, development of capital markets also plays an important part in relieving the 
financial burden of financially constrained firms. With the development in financial systems, 
fewer chances for frauds arise, hence, investors’ confidence is boosted, and consequently, 
investors are more willing to offer funds to firms via investments in their stocks. Moreover, 
raising finance through stock market is relatively cheaper than taking up banks’ loans or using 
the bond market. Lewis and Tan (2016) point out managers generally prefer equity financing 
over debt financing while pursuing corporate investment decisions. Liu (2013) finds evidence 
showing that firms’ dependence on cash, and hence financial constraint, decreases in a liquid 
stock market. 
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Large number of financing channels and fewer frictions for fund users enable capital to flow 
smoothly in the economy. The development of the banking and stock market sectors helps to 
improve financial outlays of constrained firms, which exerts positive impact on their corporate 
investment. 
The finding that financial development helps to lessen financial constraints of firms that are 
under-investing is inconsistent with Antzoulatos et al. (2016). They report that financial 
development is not significant in reducing (or increasing) financial constraints of firms. However, 
our finding is not entirely in contrast to their conjecture. This is because their analysis is based 
on firms that are considered ‘lemons’ or below investment grade firms, whereas, financially 
constrained firms in our sample are not necessarily lemons. 
Nonetheless, a large body of literature favors the amplification of financial development on 
improving the financing issues faced by financially constrained firms. For example, Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) demonstrate that financing of firms is improved after development in the 
financial system of a country. Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) develop a model to show that 
financial development in a country eases the financing burden of firms that are financially 
constrained. Beck and Levine (2004) also find that financial development is important in 
reducing financial constraints of firms that encounter troubles in using external markets. Castro 
et al. (2015) document that financial constraints of firms are decreased with the development in 
financial structure. These studies are consistent with results of the extant study.  
When H2 is re-examined through Eq. (3), results in Table 3 show that the interaction effect of 
Fin_development×Fin_constraints (β2) is found to be positively and statistically significant at 10 
percent level (β2 = 0.034, t-stat = 1.89). This suggests that, ceteris paribus, when 
Fin_development in a country is increased by one standard deviation, it is expected that 
Corp_investment will increase by 0.034 percent in firms that are financially constrained and are 
likely to under-invest. 
These results are consistent with our Eq. (2) findings in which financial development is found 
to have a positive impact on corporate investment of firms that are under-investing. Again, these 
results support H2. 
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4.3. H3: Financial development reduces investment inefficiency by negatively impacting over-
investment in firms  
H3 tests the prediction that financial development reduces over-investment in firms that are 
likely to over-invest due to agency issues. Following the methodology of Biddle et al. (2009), H3 
is firstly tested by the coefficient of the interaction term Fin_development×Over_investment (β2) 
in Eq. (2). As discussed earlier, to find supporting evidence for H3, β2 is expected to be negative 
and statistically significant. 
The testing results of Eq. (2) in Table 3 show that in firms that are likely to be over-investing, 
the overall impact of financial development is found to be negatively and highly statistically 
significant at 1 percent level (β1+β2 = -0.902, t-stat = -2.94). This infers that, ceteris paribus, 
when Fin_development in a country is increased by one standard deviation, it is expected that 
Corp_investment will decrease by 0.902 percent in firms that are more prone to over-investing. 
In a similar vein, the effect of the interaction term Fin_development×Over_investment (β2) is 
also found to be negatively and highly statistically significant in determining Corp_investment at 
1 percent level (β2 = -1.324, t-stat = -3.43). 
The findings of the H3 support the prediction that financial development helps to address the 
over-investment problem in firms that are facing agency issues. These issues persist due to the 
incapability of diffused, and unwillingness of concentrated shareholders in properly monitoring 
and controlling the management. Many shareholders rely on others to analyze and monitor firms 
and are generally unable to fully understand information available to them. Even, if they have the 
expertise to comprehend and use complex data, firm managers still maintain great control over 
the availability of information (Levine, 2005). Concentrated ownership on the other hand 
exercises and exerts powers on managers to adopt policies which are beneficial to them at the 
cost of firms’ resources (Morck et al., 2005). According to them, these factors impede the 
fostering of good corporate governance policies which results in failure to properly monitor and 
evaluate managers’ over-investing decisions. 
The negative relationship between over-investment and financial development can also be 
attributed to the benefits of improvement in the banking and stock market sectors. Indeed, 
financial development helps to curb the over-utilization of firms’ resources in various ways. 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
 
29 
 
Firstly, development of a banking sector enhances the capacity of banks to acquire extensive 
and accurate information about firms, and to monitor them effectively. Banks have an incentive 
to closely observe and evaluate firms’ decisions as they provide a huge amount of loans to the 
enterprises. Banks constantly monitor and oversee the performance and governance of firms so 
that funds are only allocated to those that have good future prospects and adhere to good 
governance practices (Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1990). These activities performed by banks 
present a monitoring mechanism which limits managers to involve in activities detrimental to 
firms’ value (Diamond, 1984).  
Secondly, with financial development, more banks are available to extend credits to firms, 
thereby, intensifying the competition among them. This makes debt an attractive financing 
option and tempts managers to include more debt in the capital structure. Beneficial 
ramifications of debt contracts to discipline managers from over-investing are well cited in the 
literature (Aghion et al., 1999; Aivazian et al., 2005; Hovakimian, 2011; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). As, over-investment is likely to happen where managers have large sum of free cash flow 
at their disposal, Aghion et al. (1999) develop a model to show that debt is useful in disciplining 
managers as it reduces the amount of free cash flow under their disposal. Since, removing a 
substantial amount of cash flow via debt commitments puts pressure on firms’ financial position; 
managers give due evaluation to current and future investment decisions. Hovakimian (2011) 
finds that managers adjust their capital allocation and give priority to valuable investment 
projects when diversified firms are faced with financial constraints. Inclusion of debt in the 
capital structure helps to induce managers from over-investing as they have obligations to pay 
fixed payments. More importantly, removing a large chunk of free cash flow impairs managers’ 
ability to pursue their personal motives and undertake unnecessary risks. This in turn reduces 
over-investment and improves investment efficiency in firms. 
Similarly, stock markets can play an important role in reducing agency issues related to over-
investment in several ways. Firstly, along with banks, financial markets exert parallel influence 
on listed firms to incorporate good corporate governance practices. Developed stock markets 
have adopted and enacted numerous codes of conduct that set the standard of good corporate 
governance structure. Indeed, stock markets regulate listed firms to ensure that they adhere to 
acceptable governance practices which reduce the manifestation of agency issues. Black and 
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Moersch (1998) even stress that stock markets are superior in addressing governance issues than 
banks, as the latter can lose impartiality by overlooking the performance of inefficient managers 
who are dearer to banks.  
Secondly, stock markets can also influence corporate governance in firms indirectly. Conflict 
between managers and shareholders can be minimized by linking the compensation of CEOs 
with the stock performance of the firm (Datta et al., 2001; Kang et al., 2006). This arrangement 
reduces managers’ incentive to engage in over-investment activities which can adversely affect 
firm stock value. In this way, with an efficient stock market environment, where stock price 
manipulation is at the very least, it can reinforce good corporate governance and can address the 
over-investment issue. 
Thirdly, in a financially developed country, numerous financial intermediaries, credit agencies 
and professional analysts are constantly evaluating the actions and decisions of firms. This offers 
valuable information to investors about the outlook of firms. Levine (2005) suggests that 
investors attach great importance to the critical information available about firms, but acquiring 
information about firms is not only costly but also difficult. Boyd and Smith (1992) also show 
that investors prefer to invest their capitals in countries where monitoring mechanisms are strong 
and information about firms is transparent. Investors give considerations to expert opinions 
which have implications on resource allocation by managers. Generally, investors favor those 
firms that endorse efficient investment decisions. 
The above-discussed assortment of reasons suggests that the problem of over-investment will 
be less pervasive in countries with higher degree of financial development. This outcome is 
largely due to the monitoring mechanisms and good governance practices yielded by financial 
development.  
Estimation results of Eq. (2) for both H2 and H3 are depicted in Figure III. The figure shows 
the relationship between Corp_investment and Fin_development. Based on the estimated 
coefficients, holding other variables constant, it is evident that the effect of financial 
development is likely to become strong, when the likelihood of over-investment is increased.  
Empirical findings of Eq. (4) are also reported in Table 3. By and large, regression results of 
our control variables are consistent with previous studies. The interaction term 
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Fin_development×Free_CF (β2 = -0.022, t-stat = -2.10) is negative and statistically significant at 
5 percent level. This result implies that, keeping others constant, increasing Fin_development in 
a country by one standard deviation is expected to decrease the Abn_investment by 0.022 percent 
in firms that are over-investing. This finding indicates that financial development plays a role in 
curbing over-investment, and hence, has positive ramifications on corporate investment 
efficiency. The results of Eq. (4) confirm the findings of Eq. (2) for H3, and reaffirm that those 
firms that are over-investing due to agency issues, reduce their investment spending when 
development in the financial sector increases. Once more, we find supporting evidence for H3. 
[insert Figure III here] 
 
 
Figure III. Regression Relationship (Hypothesis H2 and H3). This figure shows the 
regression relationship between Corp_investment residuals and Financial development of a 
country. The top line represents an association when Overinvestment is zero, and hence, under-
investment is most likely. The bottom line depicts the relationship when Overinvestment is most 
likely. Data is collected from Datastream and World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). 
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5. Robustness checks 
We conducted four additional evaluations to ensure that our empirical results are robust. 
These robustness checks include: 1) applying the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
technique; 2) using different specifications of dependent and independent variables; and, 3) 
dividing data into subsamples. 
5.1. Estimation by Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
To confirm the robustness of our earlier results the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimation technique is used. These estimators are developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), 
Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998). System-GMM is applied to perform 
the test. To execute a dynamic regression model, a lagged dependent variable is added to the 
right-hand-side of Eq. (1) and Eq. (2). 
Results of the System-GMM estimations for H1 in Table 4 show that Fin_development is 
positive and statistically significant at 10 percent level in determining Corp_investment. This 
statistics confirms H1. For H2, Fin_development again is positive and statistically significant at 1 
percent level in influencing Corp_investment. The coefficient of Fin_development, in this case, 
measures the relationship between financial development of a country and corporate investment 
when under-investment is more likely. The result, therefore, reaffirms the findings of Eq. (2) for 
H2. The System-GMM result of the interaction term Fin_development×Over_investment is also 
consistent with the earlier results of Eq. (2). The coefficient of this interaction term reveals a 
negative and statistically significant relationship at 1 percent level. This finding also provides 
support to the earlier result of H3, and suggests that when Fin_development is improved, 
Corp_investment of firms which are likely to over-invest will fall. 
5.2. Alternative Specifications of Financial Development Variable  
In this study, our financial development variable represents a sum of stock market and 
banking sector development. To gain further insights and reaffirm our previous empirical results, 
we separate our original Fin_development variable into two components: stock market 
(Stock_development) and banking (Bank_development) development. Stock_development is the 
development in the stock market and is measured as the ratio of stock market capitalization to the 
GDP of a country. Bank_development is measured as a ratio of credit provided by the banks to 
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the GDP of a country. Both Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) are re-estimated by replacing Fin_development 
and Fin_development×Over_investment with Stock_development and Stock_development× 
Over_investment, and the same with Bank_development. 
Estimation results are presented in Table 4, and they indicate that Stock_development is 
positive and statistically significant in determining Corp_investment at 1 percent level. Similarly, 
the relationship between the interaction term Stock_development×Over_investment and 
Corp_investment of over-investment firms is found to be negative and statistically significant at 
5 percent level. These results are in line with the expectations and corroborate earlier findings of 
our three hypotheses. 
Similarly, the relationship of corporate investment with banking sector development is also 
analyzed. As predicted, the results in Table 4 show that Bank_development is associated 
positively and statistically with Corp_investment at 5 percent significance level. Again, the 
coefficient of the interaction term Bank_development×Over_investment is found to be significant 
at 1 percent level, and negatively impacting Corp_investment of firms that are over-investing. 
These observations confirm the consistency of the Fin_development variable used in this study 
and also provide credence to our earlier findings.  
[insert Table 4 here]
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 GMM  Stock_development Bank_development 
 Eq. (1) Eq. (2)  Eq. (2) Eq. (2) 
lag. Corp_investment 0.359*** 0.267***    
 (4.48) (3.28)    
Fin_development 2.128* 12.364***    
 (1.72) (2.83)    
Fin_development×Over_investment  −29.830***    
  (−2.61)    
Stock_development    0.343***  
    (3.46)  
Stock_development×Over_investment    −0.722**  
    (−2.09)  
Bank_development     0.235** 
     (2.10) 
Bank_development×Over_investment     −2.320*** 
     (−5.79) 
Joint impact (β1 + β2)  −17.468**  −0.378 −2.084*** 
  (−2.35)  (−1.44) (−6.24) 
Cash 11.752 8.684  2.876*** 2.801*** 
 (0.91) (0.72)  (9.16) (9.10) 
Sales −5.894** −3.166  0.386*** 0.377*** 
 (−2.52) (−1.13)  (5.02) (4.90) 
Fin_leverage −12.908* −11.488  −2.430*** −2.389*** 
 (−1.70) (−1.29)  (−13.05) (−12.93) 
Firm_size −0.584 −2.004  −1.281*** −1.300*** 
 (−0.80) (−0.98)  (−18.07) (−18.52) 
Tangibility 24.115*** 21.665***  5.120*** 5.162*** 
 (3.22) (2.61)  (15.20) (15.48) 
TobinQ 0.704 −1.405  1.602*** 1.558*** 
 (0.76) (−1.13)  (25.28) (25.43) 
Slack −0.044 −0.074  −0.021*** −0.019*** 
 (−0.09) (−0.19)  (−3.18) (−2.94) 
Loss −9.246*** −13.527***  −0.851*** −0.848*** 
 (−3.29) (−4.35)  (−15.27) (−15.17) 
Dividend −2.049 2.599  0.659*** 0.652*** 
 (−0.52) (0.69)  (8.60) (8.58) 
Constant 14.34 29.27  21.33*** 21.58*** 
 (1.34) (1.21)  (23.46) (23.86) 
Firm fixed effect Included  Included  Included Included 
Country fixed effect Included Included  Included Included 
Time fixed effect Included Included  Included Included 
Observations 107,537 104,641  105,661 107,751 
Firms 10,891 10,661  10,686 10,802 
Adjusted R-squared    0.153 0.152 
Data is collected from Datastream and World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). 
Stock_development is a ratio of stock market capitalization to the GDP, while, Bank_development is a ratio of 
credit extended by banks to the GDP of a country. t-statistics are in parentheses and are based on robust 
standard errors. 
***
p<0.01,
**
p<0.05,
*
p<0.10. 
Table 4. Robustness Check Results of GMM and Stock_development, Bank_development 
Variables
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5.3. Alternative Proxies of Dependent and Independent Variables 
Corporate investment proxy. We use alternative measures of our dependent variable 
Corp_investment to test if the main results are sensitive to these changes. Two alternative 
measures of Corp_investment are investigated: 1) the ratio of Capex less cash receipts from 
property, plant and equipment divided by lagged total assets; and, 2) Capex divided by total 
capital. Estimation results of these re-defined corporate investment variables in Table 5
8
 confirm 
that our earlier findings are rigorous to these alternative measures.  
Over-investment proxy. Biddle et al. (2009) use a ranking variable based on the amount of cash 
flow and level of debt amassed by firms to measure the likelihood of over-investment. In this 
study, their over investment variable is modified by incorporating firm size to measure the over-
investment tendencies of firms. The earlier regression models used in this study are based on this 
newly construct of over-investment. To test for result robustness, we apply Biddle’s ranking 
variable to Eq. (2). The re-examined results exhibit in Table 5 reveal that our earlier findings are 
comparable to those of Biddle et al. (2009). 
[insert Table 5 here] 
  
                                                 
8 
We also provide earlier estimation results in first column of Table 5 for comparison purpose.  
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 Eq. (2) 
 Capexi,t 
/TAi,t−1 
 Capexi,t 
/Ki,t-1              
Capexi,t− 
PPEi,t/TAi,t−1 
Over_ 
investment
BD
 
Fin_development 0.423*** 0.801*** 0.420*** 0.448*** 
 (3.85) (4.69) (3.01) (4.43)    
Fin_development×Over_investment −1.324*** −2.846*** −1.807***                 
 (−3.43) (−4.75) (−3.30)                 
Fin_development×Over_investment
BD
    −1.657*** 
    (−4.28)    
Joint impact (β1 + β2) −0.902*** −2.045*** −1.387*** −1.209*** 
 (−2.94) (−4.27) (−3.06) (−3.80) 
Cash 2.860*** 2.985*** 6.637*** 3.395*** 
 (9.10) (6.78) (15.09) (10.69)    
Sales 0.382*** 1.950*** 0.289*** 0.319*** 
 (4.95) (14.82) (2.63) (4.14)    
Fin_leverage −2.400*** −3.246*** −0.585* −2.426*** 
 (−12.85) (−10.49) (−1.93) (−13.03)    
Firm_size −1.283*** −2.005*** −2.824*** −1.441*** 
 (−17.97) (−16.74) (−23.57) (−20.62)    
Tangibility 5.177*** 6.172*** −5.164*** 5.156*** 
 (15.25) (11.90) (−10.58) (15.25)    
TobinQ 1.613*** 2.284*** 2.352*** 1.584*** 
 (25.34) (23.66) (27.17) (25.24)    
Slack −0.021*** −0.020** 0.013 −0.020*** 
 (−3.11) (−2.09) (1.30) (−2.90)    
Loss −0.854*** −0.816*** −2.236*** −0.847*** 
 (−15.15) (−8.42) (−21.15) (−15.08)    
Dividend 0.655*** 0.655*** 1.412*** 0.650*** 
 (8.49) (5.12) (11.59) (8.45)    
Constant 21.30*** 35.13*** 39.77*** 23.57*** 
 (23.25) (23.02) (26.54) (26.06)    
Firm fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Country fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Time fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Observations 104,895 105,005 105,441 105,081    
Firms 10,687 10,687 10,714 10,700 
Adjusted R-squared 0.151 0.150 0.135 0.158    
Data is collected from Datastream and World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). Capex is 
the capital expenditure, PPE is the amount of property, plant and equipment, TA is the amount of total 
assets and K is the capital amount.  Over_investment
BD
 is a ranking variable based on the values of 
cash flow and debt. t-statistics are in parentheses and are based on robust standard errors. 
***
p<0.01,
**
p<0.05,
*
p<0.10. 
Table 5. Robustness Check Results of Alternative Corporate Investment and Over 
Investment Proxies 
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5.4. Dividing Data into Subsamples 
Robustness check is also carried out by partitioning the sample of OECD countries into three 
groups according to their Year-on-Year (YOY) Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates. 
Specifically, the data is divided into following subsamples: High GDP growth represents the 
fourth quartile values; Medium GDP growth is based on second and third quartile; while, Low 
GDP growth represents subsample when values of GDP growth fall in first quartile. Eq. (2) is re-
estimated for these three subsamples, and the results are cited in Table 6.  
These results largely support our earlier findings in the relationship between Corp_investment 
and Fin_development of both over and under-investing firms. However, a very distinctive pattern 
emerges showing how this relationship varies among the three subsamples. For under-investment 
firms, the magnitude of β1 increases (from 0.218 for Low Growth to 0.490 for High Growth), 
likewise, for over-investment firms β2 also increases (from -1.337 to -2.862, correspondingly) 
with GDP growth rates. These figures infer that financial development is most effective on 
improving investment efficiency for both under- and over-investment firms in countries with 
high economic growth. This positive effect is probably because countries with high economic 
growth have more resources to develop and strengthen their financial systems, and hence, 
reducing firm investment inefficiency. Overall, H2 and H3 are supported when the data is 
divided into these three subsamples, more importantly, this partitioning process highlights one 
key characteristic between financial development and corporate investment among countries 
when economic growth is taken into consideration.  
[insert Table 6 here]
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Table 6. Robustness Check Regression Results of Subsamples 
 
Fin_ 
development 
Fin_ 
development 
×  
Over_ 
investment 
Joint impact 
(β1 + β2) 
Cash Sales 
Fin_ 
leverage 
Firm_size Tangibility TobinQ Slack Loss 
Dividen
d 
Obs. Adj. R
2
 
Predicted 
sign 
+ − − + + − + + + − − +   
All OECD sample 
countries 
             
 0.423
***
 
(3.85) 
−1.324*** 
(−3.43) 
−0.902*** 
(−2.94) 
2.860
***
 
(9.10) 
0.382
***
 
(4.95) 
−2.400*** 
(−12.85) 
−1.283*** 
(−17.97) 
5.177
***
 
(15.25) 
1.613
***
 
(25.34) 
−0.021*** 
(−3.11) 
−0.854*** 
(−15.15) 
0.655
***
 
(8.49) 
104,895 0.151 
               
High GDP growth              
 0.490
**
 
(2.18) 
−2.862*** 
(−3.11) 
−2.372*** 
(−3.19) 
4.158
***
 
(4.28) 
0.405
**
 
(2.12) 
−2.661*** 
(−5.00) 
−1.940*** 
(−9.43) 
3.035
***
 
(4.04) 
2.364
***
 
(12.59) 
−0.035 
(−1.49) 
−1.273*** 
(−5.68) 
1.163 
(4.58) 
18,491 0.185 
               
Med. GDP growth              
 0.440
***
 
(3.43) 
−1.372*** 
(−3.10) 
−0.931*** 
(−2.69) 
2.890
***
 
(7.79) 
0.279
***
 
(3.16) 
−2.360*** 
(−11.20) 
−1.303*** 
(−15.78) 
5.212
***
 
(13.72) 
1.761
***
 
(23.80) 
−0.020*** 
(−2.22) 
−1.007*** 
(−13.40) 
0.640
***
 
(6.50) 
49,960 0.160 
               
Low GDP growth              
 0.218 
(1.40) 
 
−1.337*** 
(−2.96) 
−1.119*** 
(−3.19) 
3.185
***
 
(5.71) 
0.704
***
 
(5.00) 
−3.072*** 
(−8.47) 
−0.894*** 
(−8.39) 
5.398
***
 
(8.17) 
1.124
***
 
(11.12) 
−0.021*** 
(−3.00) 
−0.446*** 
(−6.69) 
0.485
**
 
(5.25) 
31,469 0.116 
Data is collected from Datastream and World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). Dependent variable is Corp_investment. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth 
is based on Year-on-Year (YOY) GDP growth values. Low GDP growth represents subsample when values of GDP growth fall in first quartile, medium GDP growth is 
based on second and third quartile, while, high GDP growth represents the fourth quartile values. t-statistics are in parentheses and are based on robust standard errors. Firm 
fixed effects, time fixed effects and country fixed effects are included for each model. 
***
p<0.01, 
**
p<0.05,
 *
p<0.10. 
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6. Conclusions 
This study begins with firstly examining the relationship between financial development and 
corporate investment in 35 OECD member countries and then proceeds to investigate the 
mechanisms through which financial development can impact investment efficiency of non-
financial firms. Supported by prior research, we provide detailed discussions on how financing 
constraints and agency issues of firms can distort investment decisions. Firms that have limited 
capacity to obtain external financing are forced to cut investment outlays which leads to under-
investment. On the other hand, several agency issues could impair managers’ judgments and lead 
to over-investment of firms’ resources in unprofitable projects. This study finds empirical 
evidence demonstrating that financial development can reduce frictions that cause financing 
constraints to those under-investment firms, at the same time; it renders its usefulness through its 
monitoring function to mitigate agency issues in those over-investment firms. On the whole, it 
has been shown that financial development has positive consequences on investment efficiency.  
 Our empirical findings indicate that on average, a one standard deviation increase in 
financial development can help to increase 0.209 percent in corporate investment among the non-
financial firms in 35 OECD member countries. Considering the important role of corporate 
investment plays in the promotion of economic activities vis-à-vis economic growth of a country, 
this positive effect of financial development should not be discounted lightly. Furthermore, we 
have estimated that for a one standard deviation increase in financial development, it can help to 
reduce investment inefficiency in non-financial firms that are under investing (mostly due to 
financing constraints) by 0.423 percent, and by 0.902 percent for non-financial firms that are 
over investing (mostly due to agency issues). Once more, these improvements are of great values 
at both firm and economy levels.  Additionally and equally importantly, our subsample results 
bring to light further evidence for the positive association between investment efficiency and 
economic growth: less inefficiency, more investment, more economic growth, better financial 
development, less inefficiency, more investment, more growth, and so on. 
This study maintains that investment efficiency is difficult to achieve without financial 
development. Our findings are consistent with the proposition that economic potential of a 
country can be strengthen with the improvement in financial development of a country 
(Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1998; King & Levine, 1993b; Levine, 2005; Schumpeter, 1912). 
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Since corporate investment is an important vehicle of economic growth, even a slight 
improvement in investment volume could translate into the equivalent gains of millions/billions 
of dollars. 
This study could provide useful inputs for both policy makers and other stakeholders. First, 
given the importance of financial development in affecting investment efficiency, it is vital that 
policy makers formulate such policies that can help to advance the financial system of a country. 
Stringent laws and regulations about financial contracts should be adopted and enforced to 
warrant financial development. Moreover, to strengthen the monitoring function of financial 
development, bank managers are encouraged to closely scrutinize firms’ actions when extending 
credits to firms, especially, where the complementary support of financial development is 
minimal. Likewise, firm managers are advised to take advantage of financial development by 
exploring new funding sources so as to exploit valuable growth opportunities for the firm.  
Our study contributes to the corporate investment literature in two ways. First, we construct 
and employ a new over-investment measure that takes into account of firm size which is an 
important factor in determining corporate investment. Second, the literature is limited with 
respect to documenting the direct impact of financial development in terms of over-investment 
and under-investment as indicators of corporate investment efficiency. The present study adds to 
this strand of knowledge by presenting evidence in this regard from an extensive dataset.  
Despite the positive insights we offer, this study has some limitations. First, development in 
the banking and stock market sectors is taken as a proxy to measure financial development of a 
country; however, we believe a more accurate measure should involve legal effectiveness as an 
equally important determinant. Second, we primarily focus on the financing aspect of financial 
development from the supply perspective. We acknowledge that, it is difficult to provide insights 
into both supply and demand aspects of financial development concurrently in one study, and 
this is a limitation of the study and a potential for future research. Third, contrasting evidences 
have been cited in the literature about the impact of financial development on the accessibility of 
financing to firms that are financially constrained. Although, this study presents an extensive 
dataset entails a set of international countries and a time span of 25 years, a more in-depth 
analysis, such as by segregating investment-grade and non-investment-grade (lemon) firms, 
could help to precisely measure the demand side of finance accessibility issue. Fourth, 35 OECD 
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member countries are examined in this study. Although, this dataset covers almost all major 
regions of the world, the sample lacks representation from some developing and under-
developed countries especially those from Africa and Asia. How a much lower degree of 
economic and legal development in these areas would affect the relationship between financial 
development and corporate investment efficiency is a fruitful future research direction. Moreover, 
a case study based on a country specific analysis can be undertaken to advance the research into 
this topic. Additionally, only non-financial firms are considered for the extant research and 
therefore care must be taken while extending results to other sectors that are subject to different 
accounting procedures and investment objectives. 
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Appendix A 
1. Development of the KZ Index 
Following Lamont et al. (2001), KZ index is obtained by the following equation: 
KZi,t=-1.002
Cashflow
i,t
Capital
i,t
+2.083 × TobinQ
i,t
+3.139
Debti,t-1
Capital
i,t-1
− 39.368
Dividenti,t
Capital
i,t-1
− 1.315
Cashi,t-1
Capital
i,t-1
 
(A1) 
Where, Cashflow is the sum of net income and depreciation, Capital is capital stock, TobinQ 
is Tobin’s q measured as the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets, Debt is the 
total debt, TotalCapital is the sum of debt and equity, Dividend is dividend paid and Cash is the 
cash and cash equivalents. The subscripts ‘i’ and ‘t’ denote firms and years respectively. 
2. Richardson (2006) Model 
This model involves four steps. Firstly, expected investment expenditures of firms are 
predicted, by regressing investment with its lagged values and a set of other accounting 
variables. The fitted values of the following equation are considered as an optimal or expected 
investment level, which incorporates future positive NPV projects. The equation used to predict 
optimal investment level is as follows: 
Investment
i,t
= α + β
1 
Investment
i,t-1 
+ β
2 
Cash
i,t-1 
+ β
3 
Size
i,t-1
+ β
4 
TobinQ
i,t-1 
+ β
5 
ROA
i,t-1                 
+ β
6 
Fin_leverage
i,t-1
+ ε
i,t
                                                                                           (A2) 
Where, ‘i' denotes firms and ‘t’ denotes years. Investment is the investment level measured as 
a difference of capital expenditure (Capex) and property, plant and equipment (PPE) divided by 
the total assets. Cash is the net income plus depreciation divided by total assets. Size is a log of 
total assets. TobinQ is measured as a ratio of market value of assets to the book value of assets. 
ROA is measured as total assets divided by sales, and Fin_leverage is measured as the sum of 
long-term debt and short-term debt divided by lagged total assets. Richardson (2006) points out 
that the fitted values of the above equation can be considered as the optimal investment level 
(Opt_investment). 
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Secondly, the difference between the fitted values of optimal investment and the observed 
investment values is calculated to compute un-explained/abnormal investment. This abnormal 
investment can either take on positive or negative values depicting over-investment or under- 
investment respectively, as follows: 
Abn_investment
i,t
 = Opt_investment
i,t
− Investment
i,t
   (A3) 
In Eq. (A3), Abn_investment is the investment level that deviates from expected investment 
level, Opt_investment is the fitted values of Eq. (A2) and Investment is the actual observed 
values of Eq. (A2). 
Thirdly, the amount of funds which are required to maintain optimal investment levels is 
calculated. These funds are available on companies’ annual statements under depreciation, 
amortization and depletion head. Therefore, maintenance investment, Maint_investment, is: 
Maint_investment
i,t
= Depreciation, Amortization and Depletion
i,t
   (A4) 
Fourthly, the amount of free cash flow available in excess of the amount required for optimal 
investment and its maintenance is calculated. According to Richardson (2006) and Guariglia and 
Yang (2016), any surplus amount of free cash flow, i.e. over and above required for investment 
expenditures, is a candidate to serve as a proxy for agency cost of over-investment. Thus, this 
agency cost is calculated by subtracting the expected and maintenance investment from the free 
cash flow: 
Agency_cost
i,t
= Free_CF
i,t
− Opt_investment
i,t 
− Maint_investment
i,t  
(A5) 
Where, Free_CF is the amount of free cash flow available to the firm calculated as the 
amount of cash from operating activities.
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Appendix A 
 Country
*
 Number of firms Number of observations 
1 Australia                      508                                 3,713  
2 Austria                      119                                 1,657  
3 Belgium                      123                                 1,521  
4 Canada                      313                                 1,849  
5 Chile                      115                                 1,290  
6 Czech Republic                       90                                    650  
7 Denmark                      139                                 1,586  
8 Estonia                       15                                    109  
9 Finland                       97                                 1,160  
10 France                      385                                 4,283  
11 Germany                      371                                 3,699  
12 Greece                      220                                 1,654  
13 Hungary                       21                                    193  
14 Iceland                       15                                    119  
15 Ireland                       53                                    597  
16 Israel                       54                                    728  
17 Italy                       59                                    645  
18 Japan                   1,879                                18,740  
19 Latvia                       43                                    373  
20 Luxembourg                       44                                    294  
21 Mexico                      286                                 2,750  
22 Netherlands                      568                                 7,035  
23 New Zealand                      210                                 1,253  
24 Norway                      215                                 2,042  
25 Poland                      373                                 2,266  
26 Portugal                       63                                    643  
27 Slovakia                       10                                      89  
28 Slovenia                       22                                    138  
29 South Korea                      793                                 5,977  
30 Spain                      260                                 3,854  
31 Sweden                      394                                 3,976  
32 Switzerland                      286                                 3,299  
33 Turkey                      260                                 1,651  
34 UK                      717                                10,353  
35 US                   1,895                                20,150  
 Total                  11,015                              110,336  
The table provides the list of countries, number of firms and number observations in the dataset. 
The dataset is dominated by US, Japan and the UK firms, however, we conduct analysis by 
dividing the data into different subsamples in Section 5.3 and the results are not influenced by 
these large countries. 
Table A1. Sample Coverage 
                                                 
*
Dataset consists of all member countries as on January 2018. Lithuania joined the OECD afterwards on July 5, 
2018. 
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Appendix A 
 
Corp_ 
investmen
t 
Fin_ 
developmen
t 
Cash  Sales 
Fin_leverag
e Firm_size 
Tangibilit
y TobinQ Slack Loss 
Fin_developmen
t -0.14
***
 
         
Cash  0.08
***
 0.15
***
 
        
Sales 0.01
**
 0.02
***
 -0.04
***
 
       
Fin_leverage 0.17
***
 -0.02
***
 -0.08
***
 -0.04
***
 
      
Firm_size -0.08
***
 -0.03
***
 -0.27
***
 0.00 0.11
***
 
     
Tangibility 0.55
***
 -0.13
***
 -0.15
***
 -0.13
***
 0.26
***
 0.08
***
 
    
TobinQ 0.12
***
 0.10
***
 0.35
***
 0.11
***
 -0.17
***
 -0.09
***
 -0.11
***
 
   
Slack -0.11
***
 0.09
***
 0.39
***
 -0.07
***
 -0.07
***
 -0.22
***
 -0.28
***
 0.16
***
 
  
Loss 0.05
***
 0.12
***
 0.21
***
 -0.27
***
 0.01
***
 -0.46
***
 -0.02
***
 -0.07
***
 0.19
***
 
 
Dividend -0.09
***
 -0.09
***
 -0.23
***
 0.13
***
 -0.10
***
 0.46
***
 0.02
***
 -0.07
***
 -0.18
***
 -0.48
***
 
Data is collected from Datastream and World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). This table provides Pearson’s pairwise correlation 
among main variables. All variables are explained in Table 1.
 ***
p<0.01, 
**
p<0.05,
 *
p<0.10. 
Table A2. Correlation Matrix 
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Highlights: 
 Financing constraints and agency issues of firms can distort investment decisions 
causing investment inefficiency in non-financial firms in OECD countries 
 Financial development can reduce frictions that cause financing constraints and 
enhance investment in non-financial firms that are under-investing 
 Monitoring function rendered by financial development can mitigate agency issues 
prevalent in non-financial firms that are over-investing 
 Overall financial development has positive ramifications on corporate investment 
efficiency of non-financial firms in OECD countries 
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